Abstract. Received auction theory prescribes that a reserve price which maximizes expected pro…t should be no less than the seller's own value for the auctioned object.
Introduction
Reserve prices in real-world auctions are often very low. This is most obviously true of absolute auctions, which have no reserve price and are in widespread use.
1 Online auctions regularly have reserve prices so low that they must be less than the sellers' values. 2 In contrast, received theory predicts that a pro…t-maximizing monopoly seller should exclude low-valued buyers by setting a reserve price higher than his own value. Even in settings with competing auctions or endogenous entry, theory prescribes that the reserve should be set no lower than the seller's value. 3 Reinforcing the discrepancy between observed and theoretical reserve prices is empirical evidence that raising reserve prices above a seller's value can lower pro…t.
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In this paper, for second-price auctions, we provide a potential resolution to this puzzle by generalizing the standard theoretical model in two ways. Both ways are plausible for many settings in which empirical reserve prices seem too low, such as art, antique, collectibles and online auctions. First, we allow the bidders to have positively interdependent values, so that a bidder's value for the good depends on the private information of other bidders. Price discovery is one reason this is a natural assumption, even in the supposedly "private value" setting of an art auction. For example, a bidder's value for a rare painting may be determined not only by his own aesthetic taste, but also by the painting's resale price or the prestige of owning it, which in turn are positively related to the other bidders'private tastes. Second, we allow the bidders to be risk averse, which is plausible when they are consumers or small businesses. Our model is otherwise entirely standard, with fully rational 1 See, e.g., Cassady (1967) , McAfee and McMillan (1987) , Ashenfelter (1989) , Ashenfelter and bidders and independent types. The main result is that pro…t-maximizing reserve prices can be lower than the seller's value and arbitrarily close to zero.
Low optimal reserve prices arise in our model due to an interaction between the bidders'interdependent values and their risk aversion. In a second-price auction with a reserve price large enough to exclude some types of bidders from bidding, in equilibrium the lowest bid a bidder will ever make is larger than the reserve price if their values are positively interdependent. This is true even if the bidders are risk neutral, but the "gap"between the smallest equilibrium bid and the reserve price is larger the more risk averse they are. 5 When the gap is large enough, lowering the reserve price paradoxically increases each bidder's ex ante expected payment. This is because lowering the reserve induces marginal types of bidder to bid, which increases the likelihood that the winning bidder will pay the second-highest bid rather than the lower reserve price. Provided the bidders exhibit both value interdependence and risk aversion, increasing either one enough causes the gap to be so large that any pro…t-maximizing reserve price must be lower than the seller's value for the good, so long as the seller's value exceeds the lowest possible bidder value. In this case there is positive probability that the good will be sold for a price less than the seller's value.
Our …nal result bears on the use of absolute auctions. We establish the existence of an interval of possible seller values for which the seller's optimal reserve price is arbitrarily close to the lowest possible bidder value if the bidders are su¢ -ciently risk averse, and the interdependency of their values exceeds a certain bound.
In this case the outcome is nearly the same as if there were no reserve price, i.e., an absolute auction is nearly pro…t maximizing.
5 Milgrom and Weber (1982) (fn. 26) note the existence of this gap in some second-price auctions with interdependent values. The observation that the gap increases with bidder risk aversion is new to this study, to the best of our knowledge.
Related Literature
An early theoretical study of low reserve prices is by Levin and Smith (1996) , who consider pro…t-maximizing reserve prices in a symmetric setting in which the bidders' types are a¢ liated. Their main result is that as the number of bidders becomes large, the pro…t-maximizing reserve price converges to the seller's value from above in both …rst-and second-price auctions. They do not show that the optimal reserve price is ever below the seller's value -because they assume the latter is equal to the lowest possible bidder value, there is no bene…t to the seller from setting a reserve price less than this amount. More importantly, the logic of Levin and Smith (1996) depends on the types being positively a¢ liated. The more these are a¢ liated, the lower is the probability of the event in which one bidder's type is high enough for him to bid and the other bidders'types are so low that they do not bid -this is the event in which raising the reserve price increases the payment to the seller. 6 In contrast, in the present paper the bidders'types are independently distributed; reserve prices are low here solely because of the interaction of risk aversion and value interdependence in second-price auctions. Vincent (1995) provides an example in which a risk neutral seller prefers to use a secret reserve price rather than a posted one in a second-price auction. While his focus is on secret reserve prices rather than low posted reserve prices, like ours his argument also centers on the gap between the lowest bid and posted reserve price in second-price auctions that exists because of positively interdependent values. In his example, the reduced bidder participation caused by this gap is alleviated by moving to a secret reserve price format. (This result requires the seller to privately know his value.)
In a recent paper, Jehiel and Lamy (2015) present models and conditions under which very low reserve prices, absolute auctions, and secret reserve prices are optimal for risk neutral sellers. They focus on the limiting case of large numbers 6 Krishna (2010, section 8.4) gives a textbook discussion of this logic.
of bidders sorting themselves among competing sellers. A major innovation is their assumption that some bidders do not fully understand how participation rates vary with the auction format, and how reserve prices are distributed when secret. Our analysis di¤ers in that our bidders are fully rational and do not choose between competing auctions.
Organization of the Paper
In Section 2 we examine the incentives of a seller to lower the reserve price in a simpli…ed "reduced form"model of a second-price auction with value interdependent, risk averse bidders. This reduced form model is obtained from a complete model that we present in Section 3 and study in the remainder of the paper. In Section 4 we derive the e¤ects of increasing the bidders'risk aversion, and also show that if they are risk neutral a pro…t-maximizing reserve price must exceed the seller's value. In Section 5 we obtain conditions under which an optimal reserve is lower than the seller's value, and also conditions under which it is arbitrarily close to the lowest possible bidder value. The Appendix contains proofs missing from the text.
An Incentive to Lower the Reserve
Consider a second-price auction for a good (object, asset) owned by a seller who has value v 0 for it. The seller publicly announces a reserve price, r; which he chooses to maximize expected pro…t. Each of n 2 bidders then either submits a sealed bid no less than r; or does not bid. The good is sold if and only if at least one bid is submitted, in which case it is sold to a bidder chosen (randomly) among those who bid the highest, for a price equal to the maximum of the reserve price and the other submitted bids.
The information structure is characterized by symmetry and independence.
The bidders'types, t 1 ; : : : ; t n ; are independently drawn from the same distribution F on the interval [0; 1], upon which it has a continuous and positive density, f . Each bidder privately learns his type before the auction is held. For an arbitrarily chosen bidder, we denote his type and the maximum type of the other n 1 bidders as X and Y 1 ; and the realizations of these independent random variables as x and y;
respectively.
The payo¤ structure is also symmetric, with either private or interdependent values. We let U ( p; x; y) denote the conditional expected utility of a bidder when he purchases the object for price p; his type is x; and the maximum of the other bidders' types is y: The function U is continuously di¤erentiable, with partial derivatives 
Thus, a bidder submits a bid if and only if his type exceeds or equals the screening level, in which case the bid he submits is determined by the bid function.
The equilibrium screening level is determined by the reserve price. Assuming for the moment that s 2 (0; 1); a type s bidder must be indi¤erent between bidding 7 However, it should be noted that second-price auctions in general have asymmetric equilibria, even ones in undominated strategies. See, e.g., Milgrom (1981) and Krishna (2010) .
and not bidding, since otherwise a somewhat lower type would want to bid, or a somewhat higher type would not want to bid. Neglecting the zero-probability event of a tie, a type s bidder wins if and only if the other bidders'types are less than s;
and he then pays the reserve price. Accordingly, for s 2 (0; 1) the reserve price and screening level are related by
In contrast, the bid function does not depend on the reserve price. It is instead determined as usual in a second-price auction: for any x 2 [0; 1]; the bid b(x) is equal to the most a type x bidder would be willing to pay for the good given that the maximum of the other bidders'types is also equal to x. That is, b(x) is given by
Our assumptions on
Despite the generality of the present setting, standard arguments (e.g., Milgrom, 1981; Milgrom and Weber, 1982) show that for the s and b( ) determined by (2) and (3), the de…ned by (1) is a symmetric equilibrium strategy.
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For each s 2 [0; 1]; precisely one r; say r(s); satis…es (2). We thus obtain a reserve price function, r : [0; 1] ! R: Our assumptions on U imply r( ) is di¤eren-tiable, with r 0 (s) > 0 for s 2 (0; 1). When choosing the reserve, the seller need not consider any r < r(0) because it yields the same outcome as does r(0) (all types bid). Similarly, he need not consider any r > r(1) because (with probability one) it yields the same outcome as does r(1) (no type bids). We can thus assume the seller chooses a reserve price from the interval [r(0); r(1)]: This allows a convenient change of variable from r to s; we can view the seller as choosing s by setting the reserve price r = r(s):
The seller's incentives for choosing s are determined in part, as we shall see, by the magnitude of the gap between the smallest possible equilibrium bid and the corresponding reserve price:
It is immediate from (2) and (3) that ( 
This di¤erence is positive if y 2 [0; s); since r( ) is increasing. It is also positive for
This gives us the well-known result that with private values, the bidder's expected payment to the seller,
increases in s (and hence the reserve price).
In contrast, the fact that r(s) < b(s) when values are interdependent implies that we can …nd s 0 > s such that r(s 0 ) < b(s) (see Figure 1 below). Then, for y 2 [s; s 0 ) the change in the payment of a type x bidder is negative:
Raising the reserve price from r(s) to r(s 0 ) causes the bidder's payment to fall from b(y) to r(s 0 ) because the type y bidder bids when the reserve price is r(s);
but not when it is r(s 0 ): The resulting change in the bidder's expected payment,
; is thus the hatched area less the grey area in Figure 1 (both areas probability weighted). If the grey area is larger, the bidder's expected payment falls when the reserve price is raised from r(s) to r(s 0 ):
The expected payment to the seller of a type x s bidder is then
We write the partial derivative of (x; s) with respect to s as s (s) because it does not depend on x :
This expression suggests that (x; s) decreases in s if the gap is large, in which case the bidder's expected payment paradoxically increases if the reserve price is lowered.
In order to relate the sign of s to the seller's incentives for choosing a screening level, note that his expected pro…t as a function of s is v 0 times the probability of no sale plus the sum of the bidders'expected payments:
Di¤erentiation yields, after some algebra using (5) and (6),
The …rst term in (8) 
A Speci…c Model
In order to obtain sharper results, we now consider a speci…c but relatively general model that gives rise to a reduced form utility function satisfying the assumptions of the previous section. The model is along the lines of Milgrom and Weber (1982) .
Accordingly, we now assume that if bidder i obtains the object when his type is t i and the vector of the other bidders'types is t i ; his value for the object (maximal amount he would be willing to pay for it) isv(t i ; t i ). The functionv is assumed to be invariant with respect to permutations of its last n 1 arguments, to be continuously di¤erentiable with partial derivativesv 1 > 0 andv j 0 for j > 1; and to satisfyv(0) = 0:
Also of interest will be the expected value of a bidder with type x conditional on the maximum of the other bidders'types being equal to y;
where Y 
accomplished by rescalingv if necessary. 10 We use the bidder's conditional expected value function to de…ne, at any (x; y) 2 [0; 1] 2 ; a local interdependence measure:
This function measures the sensitivity of a bidder's conditional expected value to increases in the maximum of the other bidders' types relative to its sensitivity to increases in his own type. Note that is bounded below by 0; and 0 in the private values case.
Linear Example. A linear value function satisfying our assumptions is given bŷ v(t i ; t i ) = t i + P n: This is constant in (x; y) but, as is suggested by the nature ofv; increasing in the parameter and the number of bidders n:
The last component of the model to be speci…ed is the risk attitude of the bidders. Each bidder is assumed to have the same Bernoulli utility function u for money, which is twice di¤erentiable and satis…es u 0 > 0 and u(0) = 0: We now have an explicit expression for U ( p; x; y), the conditional expected utility of a bidder when he purchases the good for price p; his type is x; and the maximum of the other bidders'types is y:
This U satis…es the assumptions made in the previous section. If > 0; then values are interdependent in the sense of the previous section: U 3 > 0:
The Role of Risk Aversion
Our …rst proposition derives useful comparative statics results about the e¤ect of increasing the bidders'risk aversion on the equilibrium bid, reserve, and gap functions.
Let A := u 00 =u 0 denote the bidders'Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion function.
Proposition 1 For k = 1; 2; let u k : R ! R be twice di¤erentiable with u 0 k > 0 and u k (0) = 0; and let A k be its absolute risk aversion measure. Let r k , b k , and k be the corresponding reserve, bid, and gap functions de…ned in (2)-(4) using (10). Then, for all s 2 (0; 1];
If the inequalities in these implications are made strict, then (i) remains true if > 0 and n > 2; and (ii)-(iii) remain true if > 0.
Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1 hold because, when bidder i's risk aversion increases, his willingness-to-pay conditional on any event on which his valuev(t i ;t i ) is random must decrease. His bid b(s) is his willingness-to-pay conditional on the event fX = s; Y 1 = sg ; and on this event his value is random if n > 2 and > 0 (so that the values are interdependent). The reserve price r(s) is his willingness to-pay conditional on the event fX = s; Y 1 sg; and his value on this event is random if > 0 (since s > 0 and n 2).
More surprising is part (iii) of Proposition 1, which states that the gap = b r increases in bidder risk aversion. It does so because an increase in risk aversion decreases b(s) less than it decreases r(s): This is true because the event upon which b(s) is determined, fX = s; Y = sg; has less residual uncertainty than does the event upon which r(s) is determined, fX = s; Y sg; which causes b(s) to be less sensitive than r(s) to changes in risk aversion.
The fact that the gap increases in bidder risk aversion if values are interdependent is why risk aversion and value interdependence are both required in order for the optimal reserve to be less than the seller's value. Recall from the discussion of (8) that the optimal reserve is less than the seller's value if an active bidder's expected payment to the seller decreases in the screening level, and from (6) that the gap must be su¢ ciently large for this to be true. The gap, it turns out, is not large enough if the bidders are risk neutral, regardless of the amount of value interdependence. This is shown in the proof of Proposition 2 below, which establishes that r(s ) > v 0 if the bidders are risk neutral.
We …rst derive the bid, reserve, and gap functions for risk neutral bidders, b 0 ; r 0 ; and 0 . For u(z) z we have U ( p; x; y) = v(x; y) p. Hence, (3) yields b 0 (s) = v(s; s); and (2) implies
Integrating (11) by parts and using the de…nition 0 = b 0 r 0 yields
Proposition 2 For any v 0 2 [0; r 0 (1)); the pro…t-maximizing reserve price is strictly larger than v 0 if the bidders are risk neutral.
Proof. For 0 < s < x 1; let 0 (x; s) denote the expected payment of a bidder with type x given screening level s: From (6) and the de…nition of 0 ; the derivative of 0 (x; s) with respect to s does not depend on x and can be written as
Using (11), di¤erentiating G(s)r 0 (s) yields
These two equalities imply the following equality, and (9) the inequality:
From this and (8) we obtain Consequently, a necessary condition for the optimal reserve price to be less than v 0 is that the bidders have interdependent values and risk averse utility.
Low Reserve Prices
We now …nd conditions under which a pro…t-maximizing reserve price r(s ) is less than the seller's value. Since r(s ) r(0) = 0; the optimal reserve cannot be less than v 0 if v 0 0: If instead v 0 r(1); the outcome is uninteresting because either s = 1 and the object is surely not sold, or s < 1 and r(s ) < v 0 holds trivially. The interesting case, and the one we focus on in this section, is therefore v 0 2 (0; r (1)).
Remark. We note that while the interval (0; r (1) 
To see why (14) is true, note that (10) and (2) imply that for any s 2 [0; 1];
and so r(s) v(s; 0). This implies (14), as (9) and v(0; 0) = 0 imply v(s; 0) s:
Now we rewrite the seller's marginal pro…t in (8) as
For any v 0 ; denote the set of pro…t-maximizing screening levels as
This set is nonempty because is continuous. Consider some v 0 2 (0; r(1)) and s 2 S (v 0 ): From (15) we see that 0 (1) = nf (1)[v 0 r(1)] < 0; and hence s < 1:
If s = 0 then r(s ) = 0 < v 0 is immediate. Otherwise, s 2 (0; 1) and the …rst-order
rea¢ rming that r(s ) < v 0 when s (s ) < 0: We now seek conditions under which the latter inequality holds. In order to obtain easily veri…ed conditions, we make use of the following assumptions.
A0. F is the uniform distribution on [0; 1];

A1.
A is a nonincreasing function; and A2.v is a supermodular function.
Assumption A0 is made for the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality:
given any continuous type distribution F , the familiar normalization of letting F (t i ) be the type of player i yields an equivalent model with uniformly distributed types.
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Assumption A1 requires the bidders to exhibit nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, a commonly assumed property. As it is preserved under integration (e.g., Jewitt, 1987), A1 implies that U 11 =U 1 is nonincreasing in p:
Assumption A2 implies positive marginal interdependence: a bidder's marginal value with respect to his own type is nondecreasing in the other bidders'types. Because supermodularity is preserved under integration (e.g., Vives, 1990) , A2 implies that v x (x; y) is nondecreasing in y:
Now we de…ne a function M on R 
where the function H is de…ned by
(We suppress the argument n of M for the sake of clarity.) An important property of M is that it strictly increases in s; ; and m at any (s; ; m) 0: 12 Note also that M (s; ; m) = 1 unless (s; ; m) 0:
Henceforth, we let and m denote parameters of the bidders'utility and value functions, respectively. First, we de…ne
to be the lower bound of the Arrow-Pratt measure of u. 13 Second, we de…ne
to be the minimal amount of value interdependence. In light of Proposition 2, in the remainder of the paper we assume both and m are positive. Note that these parameters, and s; are positive if M (s; ; m) 0: The following lemma establishes that this inequality implies s (s) < 0, given A0-A2.
Given its 
From (14) we have r(s) s; which with v 0 1 implies v 0 r(s) 1 s: Hence, from (22) and M (s; ; m) > 1 we obtain As this is true for any s 2 [s " ; 1); we conclude that s < s " ; and hence r(s ) < "; for any s 2 S (v 0 ):
Lastly, we note that the lower bounds on value interdependence required by the hypotheses of Corollary 1 and Proposition 4 are not implausibly large. In the Linear Example of Section 3 we have m = 1 2 n; and so the two bounds become (n 1) > 2 and (n 1) > 4; respectively.
Conclusion
When applied to auctions, the "Monopoly Exclusion Principle" stipulates that a
pro…t-maximizing reserve price should be larger than the seller's value for the object being sold. This well-known theoretical proposition fails to hold empirically in those auctions in which the seller is observed to set no reserve price, or only a very low one. The contribution of this paper is to show that in second price auctions, even in theory the Exclusion Principle does not hold if bidders are su¢ ciently risk averse and the interdependence of their values exceeds a certain bound: the pro…t-maximizing reserve price is then less than the seller's value. As bidder risk aversion increases, the optimal reserve converges to the lowest possible bidder value, so that the equilibrium outcome is approximately that of an absolute auction.
and this inequality is strict if A 1 > A 2 when n > 2 and > 0 (so the values are interdependent). From (3) and (10) we also have
This proves that b 1 (s) (<)b 2 (s); since u 0 2 > 0: (ii) This is proved similarly to (i), using (2) rather than (3).
(iii) Letû(w) := 1 e ^ w =^ ; letÛ be the reduced form utility function de…ned from this CARAû by (10), and letr;b; and^ be de…ned fromÛ by (2)-(4).
Note that (iii) together with its strict version consists of four implications:
It su¢ ces to prove (a) and (b), since the proofs of (c) and (d) are very similar.
To prove (a), suppose by way of contradiction that s 2 (0; 1] exists such that 1 (s) <^ (s): This and (4) yield
From (2) and (3) we obtain
Since A 1 ^ , U 1 ( ; s; y) is weakly more risk averse thanÛ ( ; s; y) for any y; and so the above equality implieŝ
Now, becauseÛ ( ; s; y) is a CARA function for any y; adding b 1 (s) b (s) to the …rst argument ofÛ in the above inequality maintains the inequality:
But this, together with (3) and (23), imply an impossibility:
So the initial supposition is false, proving (a).
Implication (b) is proved similarly. The initial supposition is now a weak inequality, causing (23) to become a weak inequality. Equality (24) still holds.
Because A 1 >^ and > 0; U 1 ( ; s; y) is more risk averse thanÛ ( ; s; y) and U 1 3 ;Û 3 > 0: Thus, (24) implies that (26) is now a strict inequality. That, together with (3) and (23) 
Di¤erentiating (28) 
Since U 1 > 0 and U 2 > 0; and the …rst term of the numerator is nonnegative by (28) and U 3 0; we have r 0 (s) > 0 for all s 2 (0; 1]:
We …rst show that under A0-A2,
The …rst step in deriving this inequality is to note that, by A1, Pratt (1964, equation (21)), and the fact that u is weakly more risk averse than the CARA utility function 
Jewitt (1987) shows that A1 implies U 1 is weakly more risk averse than U . Thus, since (3) and (28) 
Now, by (3) we see that the …rst term on the right side of (29) 
where the inequality follows from Chebyshev's sum inequality, since ( ; m) 0 implies U 1 is nonincreasing in y and A2 implies v x is nondecreasing in y. Substituting (33) and (34) into (29) we obtain (30).
We now …nd su¢ cient conditions for s < 0; or equivalently, s > 0. By (6) and (30), we have 
where H is de…ned in (18) and satis…es H 0 (x) = (e 
